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III. CONCEPTIONS, VALUE AND LAW
In Western civilization, a rationally ordered universe and human ration-
ality are the central tenets of theology and moral philosophy. Conceptions,
values, and principles implied by these premises have become entrenched
in social and legal institutions. Concluding that religious teachings, even
those of antiquity, are consistent with modern legal principles is reason-
able, and almost common sense. An inquiry into whether this relationship
is to any extent causal is fascinating. Professor Jerome Hall, the first Pres-
ident of AMINTAPHIL, discusses the relationship between the Christian
doctrine of atonement and principles of modern criminal law.
BIBLICAL ATONEMENT AND MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW*
JEROME HALL**
The organization of a Section on Law and Religion in 1976 by the
Association of American Law Schools (after Watergate) was followed in
1977 by the incorporation of the Council on Religion and Law. My par-
ticipation in both led to the study of theology and especially to the ques-
tion, what, if anything, can a legal scholar, particularly one specialized in
penal law and the philosophy of law, contribute to the literature on the
interrelations of law and religion? In the English-speaking world not
many legal scholars have written on this subject, and none, to my knowl-
edge, on the interrelationship of religion and modem criminal law.1 I
here confine my discussion to the Bible and, more particularly, to some
of the writing on atonement by Christian theologians.
The central focus of Christianity is on the crucifixion and resurrection
of Jesus Christ, and the relevant theme, originating in the Old Testament
* This article was originally published in Japan in a Festschrift for Justice Shigemitsu Dando
upon his retirement from the Supreme Court of Japan. It subsequently appeared in THE JOURNAL
OF LAW AND RELIGION, Volume I, Number 2, 1983.
** Jerome Hall, LLD. (H.C.) Tfibingen University 1978, is Professor of Law at the University
of California's Hastings College of the Law. He is a past president of the American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy, a member of the China Academy, Honorary Director of the Korean
Law Center, and a Director of The Council on Religion and Law.
1. See J. HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY, chs. I and 2 (1982).
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and frequently addressed in the New Testament, is that of atonement.
Both the Old Testament and the New Testament accept and emphasize
the vicarious significance of the sacrifice-the lamb in the Old Testa-
ment, Jesus in the New Testament. The one sacrificed takes on itself or
himself the sins of Israel or the sins of all mankind. Likewise, the sacri-
fice frees all Israel or all mankind from sin, and the consequence is recon-
ciliation with God.
But modem ethics, especially Kantian, and modem penal law reject
both connotations of Biblical atonement and the relevant theology. In
modem penal law, for example, one is responsible only for his own
crimes, not for those of his wife or bother. So, too, no substitute for the
criminal will be punished. The offer of a father to go to prison instead of
his convicted son's doing so would be irrelevant, and is hardly conceiva-
ble in modem penal law. Hence, the principal problem: Is there a sharp
conflict between religion on the one side and law and ethics on the other?
Or, since one must distinguish religious faith from knowledge of positive
law and morality, are the two realms compatible?
There have been innumerable interpretations of atonement but for the
present purpose they may be divided into two types or classes-the legal
interpretation and the antilegal interpretation posited solely on God's
love. Not that the legal interpreters did not appreciate God's love; that
would be inconceivable in any Christian theologian. But they also recog-
nized the "wrath of God," his hatred of evil, and his frequent threats to
impose harsh sanctions.2 For obvious reasons, I shall be particularly in-
terested in the legal interpretation, for it is there that we find both the
direct influence of law on religion and theology, and the influence of reli-
gion through its theological view of atonement on penal law. There are
many statements in the Old Testament that express or imply one or more
of the ideas that define "atonement." "And Aaron shall offer the bull, as
a sin offering for himself, and shall make atonement for himself and for
his house.., and shall lay both his hands upon the head of the goat and
send him away into the wilderness ... and make atonement for himself
and for the people." (Lev. 16:6, 21, 24).
One thousand years separate the authors of the earliest books in the
Old Testament from the later prophets who spoke of God not as jealous
or hating but as a loving father and merciful judge. Indeed, it is in Isaiah
2. This simplification of the difference between the principal types of interpretation will be
more fully elucidated in the following discussion.
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53 where one finds the later expression of atonement to which Christian
theologians constantly refer and rely on as prophetic of the coming of
Jesus as Messiah. "He was despised and rejected by men.... Surely he
has borne our griefs and carried our sorrows.... He was wounded for
our transgressions ...upon him was the chastisement that made us
whole, and with his stripes we are healed.... He bore the sins of many,
and made intercession for the transgressors."
In the New Testament, Jesus, the perfect man-God, "died for the un-
godly;" (Rom. 5:6) "while we were enemies we were reconciled to God
by the death of his Son.... ." (Rom. 5:10) "Then as one man's (Adam's)
trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one man's act of righteous-
ness leads to acquittal and life for all men." (Rom. 5:18, also Heb. 7:25).
"By his wounds you have been healed." (1 Peter 2:24; also Col. 1:14).
"This was to fulfill what was spoken by the prophet Isaiah ..... " (Matt.
8:17). "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law.... ." (Gal. 3:13).
"Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world." (John
1:29).
What have the theologians whose interpretations have been called
"legal" said about these passages in the Bible? Tertullian (c. 155 A.D.-
230 A.D.), one of the most erudite of the Church fathers, was said by
some to be a Roman lawyer and he was even identified, probably mistak-
enly, with the jurist Tertullianus. In any case, the schools in Carthage,
where Tertullian studied, taught rhetoric, law and philosophy, and every
educated Carthaginian knew a great deal of the dominant Roman law.a
Certainly Tertullian's treatises bear the unmistakable marks of a legal
mind. His Apology Against the Heathen 4 is a lawyer's brief criticizing
Roman procedure in the trial of Christians. Tertullian spoke of "God's
wrath" and his "eternal penalties."5 His central terms-debt, satisfac-
tion, compensation, guilt-have obvious legal connotations.' He empha-
3. "... (Tertullian) displays a thorough and (it is claimed) profound knowledge of Roman
Law." (T. BARNES, TERTULLIAN 23 (1971) citing Beck, Romisches Recht Bei Tertullian and Cyp-
rian (1930)). "Secondly, knowledge of Roman law was not the exclusive prerogative of iuris consult.
It was a necessity for advocates pleading cases in court and also a normal possession of the educated
man." Id. at 24.
4. TERTULLIAN, APOLOGETIC AND PRACTICAL TREATISES published in 10 LIBRARY OF FA.
THERS OF THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH 6-12 (1854).
5. Id. at 146, 366.
6. "The old Roman law conception appears... in Tertullian's portrayal of God as Judge and
in his teaching that the relationship of man to Him is pre-eminently that of a criminal to his judge."
J. MORGAN, THE IMPORTANCE OF TERTULLIAN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOGMA 54
(1928). For examples of Tertullian's use of other legal terms, see MORGAN, id. at 67-76.
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sized man's duty to make "satisfaction to God by repenting of his sins." 7
"How foolish, moreover, how (unjust) ... not to pay the price (repen-
tance) and yet to stretch forth the hand for the merchandise- For at
this price the Lord hath determined to grant His forgiveness."' Repen-
tance was "satisfaction," 9 appeasement of the wrath of God and avoid-
ance of punishment. 10 "God sitteth over us as a Judge to exact and to
maintain that righteousness.., and with a view to this establisheth the
entire sum of His law...."11
One derives Tertullian's legal interpretation of the atonement by bring-
ing together relevant statements in several of his essays. It was Anslem
who provided the classic legal interpretation in a systematic, tight, logi-
cal discussion-the renowned Cur Deus Homo. 12 He was born in 1033
(d. 1109) in Piedmont and studied law in Pavia. His thought reveals the
influence of the feudalism of his time, of Lombard law and the Church's
penitentials. "[T]o sin," he said, "is nothing other than not to render to
God what is due." 13 "What is the debt which we owe to God? Whoever
does not pay to God his honor due Him dishonors Him and removes
from Him what belongs to Him.. ."."' "Indeed God's wrath is nothing
other than his will to punish."15 Repayment for the dishonor is not suffi-
cient unless "in proportion to the injury caused by the dishonoring, he
makes some restitution which is acceptable to the one whom he has dis-
honored. Satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of the
sin."' 6 When earthly rulers "rightly exercise retribution, the Lord Him-
self does it; for they have been ordained by Him to this end."17 It follows
inexorably that either the dishonor of God is "repaid" or there will be
punishment. 18 Thus, in the end, God cannot be dishonored.
The next step in Anselm's argument is that no man, indeed, not even
all human beings, can make sufficient satisfaction since all men are sin-
ners. Christ was a logical necessity since the required satisfaction can
7. TERTULLIAN, supra note 4, at 358.
8. Id. at 359.
9. Id. at 370.
10. Id at 371.
11. Id. at 353.
12. 3 ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (J. Hopkins, H. Richardson, trans., 1976).
13. Id. at 67.
14. Id at 68.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id.
17. Id at 69.
18. Id. at 71.
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only be paid by someone who is sinless. Sin calls for payment "greater
than any existing thing besides God.... Therefore only God can make
this satisfaction."19 But since man ought to make this satisfaction and
since only God can make it, "it is necessary that a man-God make it."20
The logic of this argument is evident in its successive steps-God's
honor, the sinner's disobedience, God's wrath, the need for satisfaction,
and the inability of sinners to justify sinners-hence the Virgin birth and
the incarnation of the man-God who pays the price and effects the recon-
ciliation.21 In later discussions of the atonement there are variations
from the rigor of Anselm's treatise, but Why God Became Man set the
parameters of those discussions whether pro or con the legal
interpretation.
Calvin (1509-1564) studied law at Orleans and Bourges; hence it is not
surprising that he praised law as God's commands "that he might lift
their minds higher."22 Law also admonishes, is a necessary deterrent23
"and urges them on in well-doing."2 4 "The law shows the righteousness
of God .... ,25 He anticipated Jhering and Fuller: ". . . if the forms of
the law be separated from its end, one must condemn it as vanity."26
Alvin wrote of "God's fearful vengeance against the whole of man-
kind."2 7 But God, while not ceasing to love his children, is "wondrously
angry toward them ...he would frighten them ...to humble their
fleshly pride, . . . and arouse them to repentance."28 Although "they
who ... provoke his wrath ... will not escape his vengeance,"29 ". . .it is
not, properly speaking, punishment or vengeance, but correction and ad-
monition."3 A secular judge "applies the penalty to the crime itself.
But when a father ... corrects his son, he does not do this to take yen-
19. Id. at 102.
20. Id.
21. See Anselm's essay, The Virgin Conception and Original Sin, id. at 143. The influence of
ancient Greek mythology and metaphysics on Christology is beyond the scope of this paper.
22. J. CALVIN, Institution of the Christian Religion, 20 LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS 349
(J.T. McNeill ed. 1960).
23. Id. at 358-59.
24. Id at 360.
25. Id at 354.
26. Id. at 349.
27. Id at 244-45.
28. Id at 577.
29. Id. at 659.
30. Id.
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geance on him or to maltreat him but rather to teach him .... 
"[T]he whole human race perished" because of Adam's disobedi-
ence.32 "This is our acquittal: the guilt that held us liable for punish-
ment has been transferred to the head of the Son of God."' 33 ".... God's
judgment was satisfied by that price.",34 Calvin writes of Jesus' sacrifice
as "his act of expiation" to "appease the father's righteous wrath. '35
Jesus' "pleading, ' 36 his intercession as man's advocate, brings "our ac-
quittal,"37 "[t]he curse.., was transferred to him... (who) clothed us
with his purity." 38
Opposition to legal interpretation of atonement, based in part on
Clement and Abelard, was eloquently expressed by Bushnell, an Ameri-
can clergyman, in 1874.39 Bushnell argued that Jesus did not suffer for
justice but in self-sacrifice. It dishonors God, indeed it implies that he is
immoral, to say that he "accepts the pains of the good in payment of the
pains of the bad."'  The legal interpretation of atonement describes "a
coarse commercial transaction."'" Law is defective, first, because it is
penal and does not bring about reform by free choice. And, second, it is
negative in its prohibitions.42 Bushnell uses the model of the family and
the school; the mother or the teacher corrects out of love. Their correc-
tion is "not judicially penal ... for it is not graded by the desert of
actions, but by what is wanted for the future benefit and due correction
of the actors."'4 3 It is not "a substantive measure of their iln-desert." 44
Bushnell thought there was "no such thing" as "a penalty unde-
served." Moreover, there is no "common measure" in undeserved penal-
31. Id at 340. "In the dogma that the whole human race is condemned on account of the sin of
its first parents, the doctrine of collective responsibility has reached its pitch." WESTERMARCK, 1
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 50-51 (1971).
32. Calvin, supra n.22, at 509, 510.
33. Id. at 351.
34. Id. at 467.
35. Id. at 502.
36. Id. at 509.
37. Id at 510.
38. H. BUSHNELL, FORGIVENESS AND LAW (1874). See Rashdall, The Abelardiun Doctrine of
the Atonement, in DocrINE AND DEVELOPMENT 128 (1898).
39. Bushnell, supra n.39, at 86.
40. Id. at 91.
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 134.
43. Id. at 135. Bushnell says "the word justice does not occur once in the New Testament...
Id. at 141.
44. Id. at 143-44.
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ties and deserved ones.45 It is contrary to the spirit of the New
Testament to list a set of "vocables" as substitutes for penalty, compensa-
tion, transferable merits, sins carried over, sins accepted for the sinner
and so on. These "theological counters" and "computations of atone-
ment" are "to any Christian believer" a "very sad affair," not "altogether
spurious," but "artificial. ' 46 In even stronger terms a contemporary the-
ologian wrote: "To speak as if the Son... appeased or propitiated God
... is blasphemy. 4 7
In a similar vein, the philosopher-theologian, H. Rashdall, critical of
every aspect of the legal interpretation, argued that Jesus' death could
help others only in the way that the acts of other righteous persons could
help others-by their example, stimulating benevolence.4 8 He also re-
jected the view that Christ's death was a ransom paid to the Devil or to
God.49 "God is a loving Father who will pardon sin upon the sole condi-
tion of true repentance." 50 He seeks reconciliation, or at-one-ment. Ter-
tullian's theory is "coarsened and legalized,""1 "poisoned by the
substitution of legal for moral conceptions." 2 To Rashdall, Anselm em-
ployed Lombard conceptions of civil law-satisfaction, debt and Wer-
gild.53 His "notions of justice are the barbaric ideas of an ancient
Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer... ."I Most
interesting is Rashdall's rejection of "the attribution of guilt to all hu-
manity for the sin of one, nor can the payment of a penalty by the sinless
Christ rationally or morally be considered to make any easier or any
juster the remission of the penalty which man owes for his own sin."' 5
"We have no right to pronounce just in God what would have seemed
the highest injustice among men. '9 56
Rashdall strikes his heaviest blow on the retributive theory of punish-
ment. That theory, he states, is implied in the emphasis on expiation and
penalty in all legal interpretations of atonement. It is "a survival of
45. Id. at 95.
46. F. DILLISTONE, THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF ATONEMENT 244 (1968).
47. H. RASHDALL, THE IDEA OF ATONEMENT IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 35 (1919).
48. Cf. Mark 10:43-45; Matthew 20:26-28.
49. RASHDALL, supra note 48, at 48.
50. Id. at 249.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id. at 351-52.
53. Id. at 355.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 356.
56. Id. at 422.
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primitive modes of thought.., it cannot be rational to inflict an evil
except as a means to good-the good of the offender or of others." It is
inconsistent with the Christian ethic of love and the character of God.
"Even on the retributive view of punishment it is impossible to defend
the punishment of the innocent in place of the guilty."'
7
In his recent book5" Hans Kiing, a Catholic theologian, adds some
surprising innovations in his criticism of the legal interpretations of the
atonement. For him God is "wholly love."59 Conspicuously omitted
from his Index are the terms "penance," "punishment," "wrath of God"
and "Hell."'  After listing the "juridical concepts" used in legal inter-
pretations-"law, guilt, penalty, reward, penance, expiation, ransom, sat-
isfaction, reconciliation, restitution,"6  he characterizes those
interpretations as "a re-Judaizing process in the name of Christianity.""2
More surprising is his statement that the idea of original inherited sin,
upon which the necessity of the God-man's intercession depends, "seems
problematic."63 He rejects the theory of redemption on which the legal
interpretation rests because it is legalistic, based on Roman law, "legal
niceties" and human justice, not on the "grace, mercy and love" charac-
teristic of the New Testament." He even rejects "sacrifice" emphasized
in the legal interpretation. "Is God so cruel, even sadistic, that his anger
can be appeased only by the blood of his Son?" Instead of "sacrifice,"
Kung would substitute "voluntary personal self-surrender".... "self-giv-
ing.",65 Instead of "expiatory sacrifice," Kung offers "reconciliation, rep-
resentation, redemption, liberation."' 66 For Kung, "God loves sinners
more than his righteous. ' 67 "He forgives instead of condemning, liber-
ates instead of punishing, permits the unrestricted rule of grace instead of
57. H. KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN (E. Quinn, trans., 1976).
58. Ma at 435.
59. Jesus often threatened hell, everlasting fire and "gnashing of teeth." Matthew 5:22, 30;
8:12; 11; 23; 13; 42; 18:8, 9. "Wrath of god" is a frequent expression in the New Testament, Mat-
thew 3:7; Romans 1:18; Ephesians 5:6.
60. KLUNG, supra note 58, at 421.
61. Id
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. at 423. Similarly, "[i]t [redemption] is ... an outstanding example of a legal notion
being taken up and made into a religious notion by priests and prophets." D. DAUBE, STUDIES IN
BIBLICAL LAW 42 (1947).
64. Kung, supra note 58, at 424-25. KUNG omits any reference to Jesus' first words on the
cross-the first line of Psalm 22.
65. KUNG, supra note 58, at 426.
66. Id. at 274. Kung's italics.
67. Id. at 313.
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law .... The God who prefers the sinner.., the prostitutes and adulter-
ers to their judges, the law-breakers and outlaws to the guardians of the
law."6 "He is a God who lavishes his grace on those who do not deserve
it."6 9 "He is not a God of law, but a God of grace."
70
The distinguished theologian, Emil Brunner, provides a detailed refu-
tation of the anti-legalist interpretations of the atonement.71 They err, he
argues, in thinking that the only alternative to Anselm is the "wholly
subjective" view that "the death of Jesus was a sublime and noble mar-
tyrdom. '72 Their most serious defect is that they trivialize guilt. "If the
Cross merely denotes the removal of a religious error (namely, that God
is not an angry Judge) then guilt is not taken seriously,"'73 Moreover, if
"guilt is merely error, and God is nothing but love, there is no need for
forgiveness; ... all you need is to know it."74
"Divine punishment also issues necessarily from the Holiness of
God,"'75 but at the same time there is "the overwhelming reality of for-
giving love."' 76 "That God can be both at once, the One who 'is not
mocked,' and the One who 'doth not deal with us after our transgres-
sions,' that neither aspect is sacrificed to the other ... this fundamental
theme of the whole Bible is the message of the Cross .... , Accord-
ingly, although Jesus' Passion is not a penalty, certainly not a transac-
tion, "it is a sacrifice, a vicarious action" in which Jesus identified himself
wholly with the human race.
Instead of deprecating law, Brunner eulogizes it. "The law is the man-
ifested Will of the Lord God.... All order, all significance, all beauty,
all trustworthiness, all constancy, all fidelity and all faith, all truth and
all good, are based .. .upon the Law, which constitutes the intrinsic
68. Id. at 435. Tillich has echoed this: ... justice is the structural form of love without which
it would be sheer sentimentality ... there are no conflicts in God between his reconciling love and
his retributive justice." P. TILLICH, 2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 174 (1957).
69. KUNG, supra note 58, at 314. "thus the law is an enemy.... The Divine Love cannot be
imprisoned in the categories of merit and justice .... " G. AULEN, CHRISTUS VICTOR 68 (A.
Herbent trans. 1966).
70. E. BRUNNER, THE MEDIATOR (0. Wyon trans. 1934).
71. Id. at 439.
72. Id. at 471.
73. Id. at 472.
74. Id. at 464.
75. Id. at 449.
76. Id. at 452.
77. Id. at 495.
78. Id. at 461.
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content of His Will .... ,"79 "[This law] demands the divine reaction, the
divine concern about sin, the divine resistance to this rebellion, and this
breach of order.... If this were not true there would be no seriousness
in the world at all; there would be no meaning in anything, no order, no
stability... chaos and desolation would be supreme."80 The Bible is
"full of such juridical expressions... guilt, remission of guilt, judgment,
judge, punishment, accusation, condemnation, pardon, release...." 81
I leave it to the reader to choose which, if any, interpretation of bibli-
cal atonement he prefers. The problem discussed here is an interdiscipli-
nary one based on certain interrelations of law and religion. More
narrowly, it is focused on the legal interpretation of atonement and espe-
cially on the opposition of vicarious and individual responsibility.
Pervading all of these problems is that of interpretation itself-what
the theologians call exegesis or hermeneutics. A Christian theologian
will interpret Isaiah 53, indeed most of the Old Testament, as prophetic
of the coming of Christ while a Jewish theologian will provide a very
different interpretation of that Testament, including Isaiah 53. So, too,
Kung's negative view of Hinduism and Buddhism is far different from
that of adherents to those world religions. Just as lawyers are influenced
by their clients' interest and interpret statutes in conformity with that
given end, so does a theologian's conception of God determine his inter-
pretation of a religious text. Just as lawyers pick and choose among the
cases so do theologians select those biblical passages that support their
ordained goal. In the practice of law, however, subjectivity is diminished
by the adversary system either directly as in the Anglo-American system
or indirectly as in the civil law systems and, also, in both, by the imparti-
ality of the judge.82
Certain other generalizations regarding the interpretations of biblical
atonement may be ventured. First, both legalists and anti-legalists agree
that Jesus bore all men's sins. But the reasons differ widely-from a be-
lief in orthodox Christology to the simple belief that Jesus identified with
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 465.
81. See J. HALL, Religion, Law and Ethics, in LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY
(1982).
82. In Judaism "atonement... is effected through suffering by the individual himself. This is
where Judaism and other religious systems differ most widely from Christianity, which does not
think of atonement as affected by man's effort or suffering.... Christianity met [this problem] with
its Christology." O.S. RANKIN, ISRAEL'S WIsDOM LITERATURE 122 (1954 reprint of 1936). See I.
al Farqi, Islum, in THE GREAT ASIAN RELIGIONS 312 (W. Chan ed. 1969).
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all suffering, sinful humanity.83
Second, both sides seem to agree that Jesus' life, if not his crucifixion,
was necessary for the salvation of sinful humanity, although again "nec-
essary" is given different interpretations ranging from acceptance of or-
thodox views of original sin and the incarnation to the inspiration of his
life "unto death."
Third, the legalists praise law and retributive justice, while the anti-
legalists criticize and condemn both. For the former, law, far from being
a burden,84 represents God's communication of his righteousness, his
guidance, and his loving chastisement to lead people away from evil and
toward goodness. For the anti-legalists, acceptance of law even as a min-
imum standard turns quickly to criticism of law as "legalistic" and, in
any case, as far inferior to God's loving grace. The parallel of that with
Plato's criticism of law in The Statesman and his preference for the jus-
tice and wisdom of the philosopher-king are striking. Equally significant
are the biblical foundations of the perennial debates between deontolo-
gists and utilitarians regarding punishment.
We can better understand atonement vis-a-vis present-day problems of
penal law if we first take a backward glance at the place of collective
responsibility and retribution in past ages. Only then can we appreciate
the fact that our ancestors were not irrational in their penology. More-
over, that history is a necessary prolegomenon to a realistic grasp of pres-
ent problems, for in that wider perspective we may discover not only that
the past can guide us toward feasible reforms but also that it imposes
limits on utopian plans to uproot retributive justice.
From the perspectives of sociology and modern penal law collective
responsibility seems superstitious and based on the myth that a society is
a great ego, a person separate from the interactions of individuals; and it
is outrageous from an ethical viewpoint since it imposes punitive sanc-
tions on innocent persons. But history reveals interesting relevant facts.
First, in pre-industrial societies, both ancient and modern, social groups
are so closely knit in intimate contact and association (whose unity was
symbolized in the leadership of a chief or ruler) that it is the most natural
83. Psalm 19. See A. BUCHLER, STUDIES IN SIN AND ATONEMENT (Intro. by F.C. Grant,
1967).
84. See H. ROBINSON, THE HEBREW CONCEPTION OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1964). In
the thought of ancient Israel "sin was more than guilt; it was pollution. It infected the whole neigh-
borhood... his city, his tribe or nation, and also their cattle and crops." F. Grant, Prolegomenon, in
A. BUCHLER, STUDIES IN SIN AND ATONEMENT XXI, XXVII (1967).
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thing in the world to think not of or as an individual but, instead, to
think in concepts of the family, the clan, the community, or the nation.
Only with industrialization and the loosening of ties does individualism
make its appearance. Accordingly, we should distinguish present-day so-
ciological conceptions of the group from the corporate idea that domi-
nated biblical times. 5
But, secondly, it has become clear that there was not simple unilinear
evolution starting solely from the idea of corporate responsibility and
ending in the substitution of the ethic of individual responsibility. From
ancient times, moral leaders, including dramatists of ancient Greece, lim-
ited corporate liability by insisting that the innocent should not be pun-
ished for crimes committed by others. Moreover, as we shall see,
although the pendulum has swung far from collective to individual liabil-
ity, corporate liability is by no means completely absent in contemporary
society, even from present-day law. It was usually the prophets who
spoke of the nation's blessings and its liability. But Jeremiah and Ezekiel
(Ez. 18) were among the first to criticize collective liability, especially the
punishment of innocent persons for the sins of others.8 6 It is also note-
worthy that in many cases when God punished the nation, it was not for
its sin but because of the ruler's sin; the king was the "owner" of the
people.8 7 Still, collective thinking was dominant.
Westermarck cites literally hundreds of examples of collective respon-
sibility among the ancient Greeks, Hebrews, Christians, Japanese, Kore-
ans, Persians, Hindus and Teutons as well as among many primitive
peoples.88 He also gives instances of the rejection of collective liability. 9
Sin was regarded as a contagious disease which could be transferred to
85. 0. Rankin, supra note 82 at 53-54, 70. Recent studies by anthropologists support the view
expressed in the Bible, namely, that individual responsibility was sometimes advocated along with
collective responsibility. One anthropologist even says: "In fact, individual responsibility always
exists inside corporate groups." In the pre-industrial societies which this anthropologist studied,
collective responsibility was manifested in relation to other groups, that is, when a member of group
A killed a member of Group B. MOOR, THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 100 (M. Glickman
ed. 1972). See T. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFIucAN CUSTOMARY LAW 134 (1954).
86. D. Daube, supra note 64, at 162-63.
87. E. WESTERMARCK, 1 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 32, Ch. 2
and 19 (1917); L. HOBHOUSE, MORALS IN EVOLUTION 70-104 (1916); POLLOCK, MkrTLAND, 1
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 678 (1923).
88. "[Flor another's sin let me not suffer." RIG-VEDA ii, 28; 29; Westermarck, supra note 87,
at 49. See, Deuteronomy 24:16 and 2 Kings 14:6.
89. Westermarck, supra note 87, at 61.
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others and spread like an epidemic.90 This led to the ritual of "transfer-
ring" the sins of the people to the sacrificed animal or the human
sacrifice. 91
Because collective responsibility means strict liability, the punishment
of innocent persons, it is abhorrent to the modem mind. As Kant put it,
penal liability is not "transmissible ... like a financial indebtedness...
only the culprit can bear [punishment] which no innocent person can
assume even though he be magnanimous enough to wish to take it upon
himself for the sake of another."92 Nevertheless, the universality of col-
lective responsibility in past ages, the group mind-set rather than individ-
ualism (although alleviated from early times by pleas to spare the
innocent), the likelihood that deterrence was also advanced by the threat
to punish a wrongdoer's family, clan or nation-these and other factors
described above made acceptance of the concept of collective responsibil-
ity natural and normal.
There is another phase of social experience that must be considered if
we are to understand biblical atonement, namely, the role of the hero in
history. If "society," viewed either as the aggregate of individuals or as a
separate holistic entity, can be harmed (e.g. in ways that distinguish
crimes from civil damages)93 it is also true that society benefits from the
sacrifice and contributions of its heroes-its great religious and moral
leaders, its artists, scientists and scholars. All through history people
have identified with and sung the praises of great men and women. In-
deed, *Carlyle hardly exaggerated when he included "Hero Worship" in
the title of his book since, for him, "Universal History, the history of
what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the
Great Men .... 9
A more circumspect study of heroes emphasizes "the vicarious gratifi-
cation of the [people's] yearnings through his presumed traits and
90. Id. at 63. Quoting Frazer: The Victim must be a "representative of the community...
accepted as a substitute on the principle of social solidarity." Id. at 67-68. See D. BROWNING,
ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1966).
91. 1. Kant, Religion Within The Lights of Reason Alone 66 (T. Greene, H. Hudson trans.
1934).
92. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 240-246 (1960).
93. T. CARLYLE, HEROES, HERO WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 1 (1840). "Such
great teachers are very few in the world.... They alone can carry us to the life divine." R. SRIVAS-
TAVA, COMPARATIVE RELIGION 241 (1974).
94. S. HOOK, THE HERO IN HISTORY 22 (1943).
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achievements." 9 Krishna took human form when the need to overcome
unrighteousness became urgent, Buddha's compassion went out to all
suffering humanity, and many heroes in Ancient Greece were believed to
be the sons of gods or goddesses. Nor is it only the great who elicit praise
and gratitude. Many soldiers have sacrificed their lives that their com-
rades might live, and countless other "ordinary" persons never men-
tioned in the history books make daily sacrifices that others may benefit.
It is in this perspective that versions of the atonement emphasizing Jesus'
identification with all troubled, rejected men and women have great
proximity to the experience of gratitude and love that people have felt for
their heroes.96
If we combine reverence for the hero and the gratitude and affection he
or she inspires-if we join that to normal acceptance of collective respon-
sibility especially in past ages, it is no great leap from that platform to
Biblical atonement in both its connotations-bearing the sins of others
and the consequent benefit to the sinners. The above experience is pro-
jected into a religious faith.
My concern here, however, is not theological, but secular,97 especially
with the interactions of law and religion. Indeed, positive law and reli-
gion are so intertwined, both in the Bible and in the Qur'an, that it is no
exaggeration to speak of the legal component of religion, of law in reli-
gion. There is no better evidence of that than the writing of the theolo-
gians who for centuries advocated legal interpretations of atonement.
If we glance at our present situation we find that some of the relevant
concepts are still operative. Samuel Johnson said: "No man is thought
the worse of here, whose brother was hanged." 98 But humanists are rare,
and who can doubt that the families of some convicted criminals are
often ostracized and suffer other discriminations? In wartime hostages
are taken or killed, prisoners in a concentration camp are held responsi-
ble for the conduct of all the prisoners, and teachers penalize an entire
class for the misbehavior of one student, especially if he does not confess.
95. Compare Kant regarding the "superhuman." "[H]is distance from the natural man would
then be so infinitely great that such a divine person could no longer be held up as an example of him.
Man would say: If I too had a perfectly holy will all temptations to evil would of themselves be
thwarted in me... I too should take upon myself not only willingly but joyfully all sorrows... even
to the most ignominious death, since I would see before my eyes the glorious and imminent sequel."
Kant, supra note 91, at 57-58.
96. For my support and defense of religous faith see supra note 92, at 57-58.
97. For my support and defense of religious faith see supra note 1, at 16-26.
98. Daube, supra note 64, at 188.
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There is strict vicarious liability in modem legal systems when an in-
nocent employer is fined because of his employee's misconduct. Innocent
stockholders pay the fines assessed against the corporation and they also
benefit from most actions of the managers. 9 In international relations,
political leaders may provoke wars, and innocent lives are lost. Thus,
collective responsibility remains very much alive. Much of it, perhaps
most of it, does not fall within the precise meaning of "crime," "criminal
law" or "punishment;" this, indeed, has been said by many scholars
about strict penal liability. But the liability of associations, social sanc-
tions, and the work of social agencies are important aspects of the wider
context in which modem systems of criminal law can be placed to the
advance of knowledge of that law.
There is a final problem to be confronted which raises the most insis-
tent of all the issues. Following precedent, we have been saying thus far
that the legal interpretation of atonement was influenced by Roman or
Lombard or feudal law. But if we press beyond those indubitable legal
factors, if we seek the cause of many of their penal provisions, we find at
the bottom of them-retribution. The usual description of the evolution
and progress of retribution seems persuasive. First came instinctive re-
taliation against aggression. Second, comes vengeance which is sup-
ported by social norms, "oo and is limited by a sense of equivalence and
reciprocity, as in barter. Finally, there emerges a principle of retribution
which is refined over the years until it becomes the retributive justice that
moral philosophers espouse.
The Bible and the history of theology reveal the outlines of the peren-
nial battle between those who would punish sinners and criminals be-
cause they were intentional wrongdoers and those who would deter or
reform them. They also reveal the commingling of retributive and utili-
tarian concepts. The sinner deserves to be punished, and punishment
will also deter potential sinners; but most of all the Bible teaches that
what is paramount is the reform of wrongdoers, i.e., reconciliation with
God, resulting from repentance, restitution, and forgiveness.
99. H. MANNHEIM, GROUP PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 43 (1955) distinguishes
strict liability from that imposed on members of a union or partnership by reliance on the act of
members in joining those associations. But surely the act of one who buys stock or joins a union is a
very slender reed on which to rest punitive sanctions.
100. H. KELSEN, SOCIETY AND NATURE 52, 55 (1943) W. McCulloch wrote that among the
Koupoules of India "the greatest misconduct is the forgiveness of an injury, the first virtue, re-
venge." KEILSEN, id. at 64-65. Kelsen says at p. 235 that the retributive principle is the origin of the
idea of causation.
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In modem times the issues have been cast in sharper, mutually exclu-
sive terms. At the one extreme is Kant's scom of the crass utilitarianism
that defends punishment only because it would deter others. For him,
every human being should be treated as an end in himself, not as a means
to extrinsic objectives. Desert is the only justification for punishing any-
one. At the other extreme is Henry Sidgwick, the eminent moral philos-
opher, who wrote that he had "an instinctive and strong moral aversion
to it [retribution] ... it is gradually passing away from the moral con-
sciousness of educated persons in most advanced communities.... ." But
he admitted that "it is still perhaps the more ordinary view." 101 Even
stronger was Rashdall's condemnation of retribution. For him, "it can-
not be rational to inflict an evil except as a means to good-the good of
the offender or of others.' 2
It is not my present purpose to unravel the complexities of the volumi-
nous literature on "punishment." 103 But I should like to suggest a possi-
ble way to advance discussion of this subject.
Retribution is a universal phenomenon and experience among primi-
tive as well as among civilized people, in ancient Greek drama, in the Old
and New Testaments."4 It is implied or expressed in every legal system,
even in those that explicitly reject it and then go on to impose punitive
sanctions on criminals in proportion to the gravity of the harms they
commit. Critics of retributive justice like Sidgwick and Rashdall believe
that all thoughtful persons reject it (pace the heirs of Kant of Hegelta)
but they regretfully acknowledge that "ordinary" people still support it.
Even Plato, on whom Rashdall relied, seems to have made room for it.
The plain fact, like it or not, is that retribution, crude or refined, has been
and is inevitable. Responsibility will vary from collective to individual,
or both may coexist, but retribution is constant. Although many aca-
demic utilitarians continue to ignore that fact or to argue as though it an
somehow be made to disappear, non-academic utilitarians simply accept
the inevitable and try to minimize its effect when its manifestation in
specific penalties does not further deterrence or rehabilitation.
The factual inevitability of retribution supports the position I have
long advocated: (1) the primacy of retributive justice on the ground of
101. H. SxiDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 281 (1901).
102. Rashdall, supra note 48, at 421, 422.
103. See Hall, supra note 92, at ch. 9, and consult the Index in J. HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND THEORY (1982).
104. Matthew 13: 41-44; 16:27; Mark 9:42.
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desert (guilt) and (2) the advance of the utilitarian ends of punishment
(deterrence and rehabilitation) so far as they do not trivialize or exceed
the limits ofjustice. 105 The pendulum has swung sharply in the direction
of retributive justice and, unfortunately, in recent legislation in the
United States rehabilitation has been ignored or rejected. Religion can
remind us of the importance of helping wrongdoers develop an apprecia-
tion of moral values. Especially suggestive are modem versions of the
legal and the anti-legal interpretations of atonement. What the philoso-
pher-king will do in Utopia or God in heaven is a matter of faith. So far
as the secular problems of crime and punishment are concerned, legal
scholars will agree that sound positive law has great value. Still it seems
necessary to stress the fact that even the soundest penal law limits what
can be achieved in relianpe solely on it. In all world religions much em-
phasis is placed on the reform of wrongdoers, thought of as turning them
from evil to goodness or as their advance in knowledge and understand-
ing. There can be little doubt that this aspect of religion has inspired the
reform of penal institutions and much concern for the rehabilitation of
their inmates.
105. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 130 (lst ed. 1947). 307-308 (2nd ed.
1960). This was not a discovery or a novelty. In 1797 Kant wrote: "He must first be found to be
deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of this punishment for him-
self or for his fellow citizens." I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd
trans. 1965).
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